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Abstract—Biometric data are considered sensitive personal
data and any privacy leakage poses severe security risks. Biomet-
ric templates should hence be protected, obscuring the biometric
signal in a non-reversible manner, while preserving the unpro-
tected system’s performance. In the present work, irreversible
face templates based on adaptive Bloom filters are proposed.
Experiments are carried out on the publicly available BioSecure
DB utilizing the free Bob image processing toolbox, so that
research is fully reproducible. The performance and security eval-
uations proof the irreversibility of the protected templates, while
preserving the verification performance. Furthermore, template
size is considerably reduced.
I. INTRODUCTION
Biometrics are nowadays being introduced into diverse ap-
plications, representing an alternative to traditional knowledge-
or token-based authentication mechanisms [1]. As any other
security technology, biometric systems are exposed to external
attacks that can compromise their security. In particular, it has
been proven that it is feasible to recover the biometric trait
(i.e., iris [2], face [3], handshape [4] or fingerprint [5]) from
the information contained in the stored biometric reference
data (template). This fact poses a severe security and privacy
problem: a skilled impostor could have access to our biometric
data. In order to prevent such privacy violations, biometric
templates need to be protected. This is a challenging task
due to the intra-subject variability of the acquired traits, as
shown by recent studies on template protection schemes [6].
In accordance with the ISO/IEC IS 24745 [7] on biometric
information protection, technologies of biometric template
protection should be designed to meet the requirement of
irreversibility: knowledge of the protected template should
not allow to determine any information about the original
biometric sample, while it should be easy to generate the
protected template. In order to fulfill this security requirement,
template protection technologies tend to obscure original bio-
metric signals in an irreversible manner. As a consequence, the
majority of published approaches to template protection report
a significant decrease in recognition accuracy [6].
In the present work, we propose a new approach to obtain
irreversible facial references (i.e., protected templates) based
on adaptive Bloom filters, while maintaining the system recog-
nition performance. A Bloom filter is a space-efficient prob-
abilistic data structure representing a set in order to support
membership queries [8]. Bloom filter-based representations of
binary biometric templates enable a rapid biometric compari-
son, while a successive mapping of parts of a binary biometric
template to a Bloom filter represents an irreversible transform.
In [9] the applicability of adaptive Bloom filters in order to
achieve alignment-free cancelable iris biometric templates has
been demonstrated. While iris biometric templates are usually
binary, face templates are represented with real values in the
vast majority of facial recognition systems. In the proposed
system, the Local Gabor Binary Pattern Histogram Sequence
(LGBPHS) algorithm is utilized to extract facial features [10],
[11] which are binarized and encoded in order to serve as input
for adaptive Bloom filter based transforms. The experimental
results show that the proposed approach generates irreversible
facial templates maintaining at the same time the recognition
performance of the unprotected biometric system.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Sect. II
reviews related work on biometric template protection for
facial images. The proposed system which obtains irreversible
facial biometric templates is summarized in Sect. III. Experi-
mental evaluations are presented in Sect. IV. Final conclusions
are drawn in Sect. V.
II. RELATED WORK
With respect to face biometrics different techniques for
biometric template protection, which are commonly catego-
rized as biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics [6],
have been proposed. Biometric cryptosystems are designed to
securely bind a digital key to a biometric or to generate a
digital key from a biometric, offering solutions to biometric-
dependent key-release and to biometric template protection.
Cancelable biometrics consist of intentional, repeatable distor-
tions of biometric signals based on transforms which enable the
comparison of biometric templates in the transformed domain
[12]. The inversion of such transformed biometric templates
must not be feasible for potential impostors.
Focusing on biometric cryptosystems, Sutcu et al. [13] pro-
posed a quantization scheme in which hash values are created
from face samples. Features are distributed into intervals by
mapping them on convolved Gaussian functions where correct
intervals are concealed by adding noise in form of fake Gaus-
sian functions. In [14], a key-binding scheme based on face
is proposed applying quantization index modulation, which
is originally targeted for watermarking applications. In [15],
a facial template protection scheme based on helper data is
presented, reporting a non-negligible performance degradation.
Ratha et al. [12] were the first to introduce the concept of
cancelable biometrics applying non-invertible transforms. At
enrolment, a non-invertible transform (e.g. surface folding) is
applied to a facial image using application-dependent param-
eters. During authentication, biometric inputs are transformed
and protected templates are compared. In [16], cryptograph-
ically secure biotokens are proposed and applied to existing
recognition schemes for face, e.g. PCA (Principal Component
Analysis). The key idea is to split biometric features into a
stable part and an unstable part. For face, the authors suggest
to simply split real feature values into an integer part and a
fractional part. Subsequently, stable parts are encrypted and
unstable parts are obscured applying non-invertible projections.
In the vast majority of cancelable biometrics approaches, revo-
cability is provided by incorporating additional secret tokens
(e.g. random numbers). This way, performance evaluations
have to be performed under the “stolen-secret scenario”, where
each impostor is in possession of valid secrets.
In [17] a technique applied to face biometrics called “Bio-
Hashing” was introduced. Basically, the BioHashing approach
operates as a key-binding scheme, using secret user-specific
tokens (unlike public helper data) at authentication Prior to
the key-binding step, secret tokens are blended with biometric
data to derive a distorted biometric template, i.e., BioHashing
represents an instance of “Biometric Salting” [6]. In most
biometric salting approaches [17], [18], subject-specific secrets
are incorporated while experiments are performed under the
non-stolen-secret scenario omitting the actual biometric per-
formance of the system. In a more recent publication [19], a
significant degradation of biometric performance is reported
for the stolen-token scenario. Savvides et al. [18] generate
cancelable face biometrics by applying so-called minimum av-
erage correlation filters which provide non-invertibility. User-
specific secret PINs serve as seed for a random basis for the
filters. In [20] user-specific random projections are applied
to PCA-based face features followed by an error minimizing
template transform. Again, the authors do not consider a
stolen-token scenario.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In order to verify an identity claim, the proposed system
follows three key steps (see Fig. 1):
A) LGBPHS: face image is preprocessed and Gabor-based
features are extracted.
B) Feature encoding and binarization: histograms are en-
coded and binarized.
C) Bloom filter computation: Bloom filters are computed
from the binarized features, and compared to the Bloom
filter-based reference template in the database to obtain
the final score.
A last critical step once the protected templates have been
generated is to perform an:
D) Irreversibility study: given a specific Bloom filter, how
many sequences can originate it? By answering this
question, the irreversibility of the Bloom filter transform
is assessed.
In the next subsections more detailed information on each
step is provided.
A. LGBPHS System
The face verification system that served as baseline for
the proposed approach is an implementation of the LGBPHS
algorithm [10], a state-of-the-art system robust to illumination
changes. In a fair benchmark among four state-of-the-art algo-
rithms for face recognition established in [21], using the same
databases and protocols, LGBPHS achieved a top performance.
Furthermore, LGBPHS requires no training.
In order to extract features from a captured biometric
sample, face images are convolved with a set of 40 Gabor
filters where phase information is discarded, thus leading to
40 Gabor Magnitud Pictures (GMP). A Local Binary Pattern
(LBP) operator is used to compute the LGBP map of each
GMP. These are further divided into 𝑀 non-overlapping
blocks, from which histograms are computed and concatenated
to form the final representation of a face image (see Fig. 1 left).
For more details, the reader is referred to [10].
B. Feature Encoding and Binarization
The histograms computed by the LGBPHS system are re-
arranged in the following manner: a rectangular matrix is
derived from each block of the original image, taking into
account the information provided by all 40 LGBP maps.
Each row of the matrix is the histogram computed from the
corresponding LGBP map (one such matrix is depicted in
Fig. 1 center). Therefore, the re-arranged template comprises
𝑀 histogram matrices.
In order to binarize these matrices, two approaches have
been considered:
1) Binarization scheme I. A fixed threshold at 0 is used
for all the bins: bins having non-zero values will be
represented with 1 after the binarization process.
2) Binarization scheme II. Different thresholds are com-
puted for each bin of each histogram from a pool of
subjects (i.e., training set). The average value of each bin
is computed across the subjects in the training set and
used as threshold: values higher than the corresponding
mean will be represented with a 1 after the binarization
process.
C. Bloom Filter-based Transform and Comparison
A Bloom filter b is a bit array of length 𝑛, where
initially all bits are set to 0. In order to represent a set
𝑆 = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, ..., 𝑥𝑚}, a Bloom filter traditionally utilizes 𝑘
independent hash functions ℎ1, ℎ2, ..., ℎ𝑘 with range [0, 𝑛−1].
For each element 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆, bits ℎ𝑖(𝑥) of Bloom filter b are set
to 1, for 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑘. An index can be set to 1 multiple times,
but only the first change has an effect. To test if an element 𝑦
is in 𝑆, it has to be checked whether all position of ℎ𝑖(𝑦) in b
are set to 1. If this is the case, it is assumed that 𝑦 is in 𝑆 with
a certain probability of false positive. If not, clearly 𝑦 is not a
member of 𝑆, hence, traditional Bloom filter are suitable for
any application where a distinct probability of false positive is
acceptable.
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the processing steps undergone by the input face image: image is divided into 𝑀 blocks, from which the LGBPHS are extracted (left). The
40 padded histograms are arranged in a matrix (center), further divided into sub-blocks (with 𝐾 sub-blocks per block). Each sub-block in the figure is binarized
and one Bloom filter is computed (right). Finally, the protected template, comprising 𝑀 ×𝐾 Bloom filters, to be stored in the database.
In the proposed scheme the original concept of Bloom
filters is adapted in order to achieve irreversible face bio-
metric templates. In the aforementioned encoding scheme,
face biometric templates are represented as two-dimensional
binary feature vectors of width 𝑊 and height 𝐻 . Binarized
features for the whole face are then divided into 𝑀 blocks
and each block into 𝐾 sub-blocks of equal size (see Fig. 1).
Subsequently, the entire sequence of columns of each sub-
bock, where each column consists of 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 bits, is suc-
cessively transformed to according locations within Bloom
filters, that is, a total number of 𝐾 separate Bloom filters
of length 𝑛 = 2𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 form the protected template of size
𝐾2𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 corresponding to one block out of 𝑀 . The final
template size will then be 𝑀𝐾2𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠. The transform is
implemented by mapping columns of the 2D binary template to
according indexes of their decimal value as shown for sample
codewords (=columns) in Fig. 1 (right); i.e. for each column
𝑥 ∈ {0, 1}𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠, the mapping is defined as,
b[ℎ(𝑥)] = 1, with ℎ(𝑥) =
𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠−1∑
𝑗=0
𝑥𝑗 ⋅ 2𝑗 . (1)
In the remainder of the paper these adapted versions of
original Bloom filters are referred to as Bloom filters.
By applying the proposed transform the original positions
of codewords are concealed; i.e. given a Bloom filter b it is
not clear from which column a distinct 1-bit in the protected
template originated. In addition, it is most likely that diverse
columns are mapped to a single index and the occurrence of
distinct codewords can not be established from the protected
template.
Typically, the comparison between a pair of binary bio-
metric feature vectors is carried out applying the simple XOR
operator. The sum of all detected disagreements between any
corresponding pairs of bits divided by the amount of compared
bits yields the fractional Hamming distance (HD) as a measure
of dissimilarity between pairs of binary biometric feature
vectors. Let ∣b∣ denote the amount of bits within a Bloom
filter b set to 1. Then the dissimilarity score 𝐷𝑆 between two
Bloom filters b𝑖 and b𝑗 is defined as,
DS (b𝑖,b𝑗) =
HD(b𝑖,b𝑗)
∣b𝑖∣+ ∣b𝑗 ∣ . (2)
The computation efficiency of the dissimilarity scores DS
is the same as that of HD . The final verification decision
is taken according to the sum of 𝑀𝐾 different DS (i.e.,
specific weights can be incorporated based on the local origin
of extracted features).
D. Irreversibility Analysis
Within the presented scheme, irreversibility is achieved
by mapping column-wise codewords to Bloom filters. Given
a Bloom filter b of length 𝑛 we restrict to inserting only
𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 codewords, where 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 ≤ 𝑛 (blocks do not
contain more than 𝑛 columns). In case of uniformly distributed
data the probability that a certain bit is set to 1 during the
insertion of an element is 1/𝑛, i.e. the probability that a bit is
still 0 is 1 − 1/𝑛. For inserting a total of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 elements
1 − (1 − 1/𝑛)𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 bits are expected to be set to 1. For
𝑛 = 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 ⋅ 𝑐 and 𝑐 ∈ ℕ (i.e. 𝑛 represents a multiple
of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠), lim𝑛→∞(1 − 1/𝑛)𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 1/e𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠/𝑛.
Focusing on biometric data this theoretical expectation does
not apply, since bits of binary biometric feature vectors must
not be expected to be mutually independent (i.e. reasonable
parts of feature vectors correlate).
Consequently, a significant amount of codewords is ex-
pected to be mapped to identical positions in Bloom filters
even for small values of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠. Let us assume ∣b∣ bits
are set to 1 within a Bloom filter after inserting 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
codewords, i.e. ∣b∣ different codewords occur in a block of
𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠. Hence, the probability of re-mapping a bit to a
certain position is 1−∣b∣/𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠. For a potential attacker the
reconstruction of the original template part involves arranging
∣b∣ codewords to 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 positions. For ∣b∣ ≤ 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 the
theoretical amount of possible sequences is recursively defined
by 𝑓(∣b∣, 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) where each of the ∣b∣ codewords have to
appear at least once within 𝑙 = 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 columns,
𝑓(∣b∣, 𝑙) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1, if ∣b∣ = 1 ,
∣b∣𝑙 −
∣b∣−1∑
𝑖=1
(∣b∣
𝑖
)
⋅ 𝑓(𝑖, 𝑙) otherwise. (3)
In other words, all sequences with less than ∣b∣ codewords
are subtracted from the number of all possible sequences,
∣b∣𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠. Fig. 2 illustrates the rapid increase of possible
sequences even for small values of ∣b∣ (note the logarithmic
scales of 𝑦 axis). Peaks are located around 3/4 ⋅ nWords,
in case of nWords = ∣b∣ we get 𝑓(𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠, 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) =
𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠! and 𝑓(1, 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) = 1.
For example: for 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 4 and ∣b∣ = 2 we get
𝑓(2, 4) = 24 − (21) ⋅ 𝑓(1, 4) = 16 − 2 ⋅ 1 = 14 possible
sequences, for 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 4 and ∣𝑏∣ = 3 we get 𝑓(3, 4) =
34 − (31) ⋅ 𝑓(1, 4) − (32) ⋅ 𝑓(2, 4) = 81 − 3 ⋅ 1 − 3 ⋅ 14 = 36
possible sequences, for 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 4 and ∣b∣ = 4 we get
𝑓(4, 4) = 4! = 24 possible sequences and so forth.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
The goal of the experiments is threefold: 𝑖) assess whether
the described encoding approach using Bloom filters causes a
loss on recognition performance, 𝑖𝑖) analyse the template sizes
of the protected and unprotected systems, and 𝑖𝑖𝑖) study the
irreversibility of the proposed scheme.
It should be noticed that a toolbox freely available online
and a publicly available database are used in the experiments,
thus ensuring the reproducibility of the research.
A. Experimental Setup
All the experiments are run on Bob1 [11], a free signal and
image processing toolbox available online. More specifically,
1Publicly available at http://idiap.github.io/bob/
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Fig. 2. Amount of possible sequences (per block) for different block sizes
and proportions of re-mapped codewords.
the face recognition algorithm considered is implemented in
the Facereclib [21], a library comprising several face verifica-
tion algorithms and database interfaces, implemented over the
more general Bob platform.
In this particular implementation of LGBPHS, each image
is divided into 𝑀 = 80 blocks. Therefore, 80 × 40 = 3, 200
59-bit histograms are computed and concatenated. Prior to
the binarization step, the 59-bins histograms are padded with
a 0 in order to obtain 60 bins per histograms, a non-prime
number that allows a further division of each block into
𝐾 = (40/𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠)× (60/𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠) sub-blocks.
The experiments are carried out on the face subcorpus
included in the Desktop Dataset of the Multimodal Biosecure
Database2 [22], which comprises voice, fingerprints, face, iris,
signature and hand of 210 subjects, captured in two time-
spaced acquisition sessions.
The face subset used in this work includes four frontal im-
ages (two per session) with an homogeneous grey background,
captured with a reflex digital camera without flash (210× 4 =
840 face samples). Eyes were automatically annotated using
VeriLook SDK 4.0, developed by Neurotechnology3.
The database is divided into a training set, comprising
all samples belonging to the first 10 subjects, and a test
set, comprising the remaining 200 subjects. The training set
is used in the second binarization scheme to estimate the
bins thresholds (see Sect. III-B). Genuine and impostor scores
for the performance evaluation are computed on the test set,
leading to 1, 200 genuine and 238, 800 impostor comparisons.
Performance is estimated in terms of False Non-Match Rate
(FNMR) at a targeted False Match Rate (FMR) and Equal
Error Rate (EER). The FNMR of a biometric system defines
the proportion of genuine attempt samples falsely declared
not to match the template from the same subject supplying
the sample. By analogy, the FMR defines the proportion of
zero-effort impostor attempt samples falsely declared to match
the compared non-self template. As score distributions overlap
EERs are obtained (i.e., the system error rate where FNMR =
FMR).
2Publicly available at http://biosecure.it-sudparis.eu/AB
3http://www.neurotechnology.com/verilook.html
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Fig. 3. DET curves for the LGBPHS system and for the best configurations
found for both binarization schemes (𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 4, 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 10).
B. Performance Evaluation
First of all, the performance of the unprotected LGBPHS
baseline system is evaluated, according to the protocol estab-
lished in Sect. IV-A. The Detection Error Tradeoff curve (DET)
is depicted in Fig. 3. The EER obtained is 6.25%. This value
will be compared to the EER of the protected system in order
to assess whether the template protection scheme proposed
degrades the performance of the face verification system.
As described in Sect. III, the performance of the Bloom
filter scheme depends on two parameters, 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 and 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠.
Exhaustive experiments determined the optimal ranges for
both parameters to be 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 ∈ {2, 4, 5} and 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 ∈
{10, 15, 20}: higher values of 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 lead to template sizes that
are not feasible to handle, while different values of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
result in lower verification performance.
The EER for the different configurations considered are
shown in Table I. Performance is similar for both binariza-
tion schemes. In both cases, the best configuration found is
𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 4 and 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 10, leading to EER = 5.50%
and 5.41%, respectively. Moreover, as we may see in Fig. 3,
the DET curves for the protected and unprotected systems are
almost identical, showing that the proposed protection scheme
maintains the performance of the original system.
It should be noted that EERs are in some cases even lower
than the unprotected system EER (6.25%). This leads us to
believe that the context-based comparison of bit blocks is
not only a valid protection approach, but also constitutes an
improved comparator with regard to the element-wise-based.
C. Template Compression
In addition to improving the performance, privacy and se-
curity of the unprotected system, Bloom filters provide smaller
templates, and therefore faster verification. The original unpro-
tected template consisted of 40 GMP × 80 blocks/GMP ×
59 bins/block = 188, 800 integer values, thus needing 184.38
KB per template. Binarizing the features divides the tem-
plate size by a factor of 8 (integer values are converted to
bits), resulting in templates of 23.05 KB. Finally, storage
requirements are considerably reduced with the Bloom filters
Bin Scheme I Bin Scheme II
𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠
2 4 5 2 4 5
𝑛
𝑊
𝑜
𝑟
𝑑
𝑠 10 6.26% 5.50% 6.08% 5.67% 5.41% 5.92%
15 6.25% 5.75% 5.75% 5.83% 5.75% 6.25%
20 6.32% 5.75% 6.00% 5.58% 5.92% 6.07%
TABLE I. EER OF THE PROTECTED SYSTEM FOR DIFFERENT VALUES
OF 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 AND 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 FOR BOTH BINARIZATION SCHEMES (BEST
RESULTS IN BOLD).
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Fig. 4. Proportion of re-mapped codewords for different values of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠
and 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 for binarization scheme I.
(BF): depending on the values of the parameters 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 and
𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠, template size is given by this formula,
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(4)
Therefore, for the best performing configuration
(𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 10, 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 4), templates require only
9.38 KB. Template size is thus reduced by 95% from the
original integer valued features, and by 59% from its binarized
form. Moreover, if the configuration with 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 20 and
𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 4 is chosen, template size is further divided by two
(4.69 KB) at a small cost in terms of EER (5.75%). In that
case, the compression rates rise to 97% and 80%, respectively.
D. Irreversibility Study
The security of the entire approach relies on the non-
invertible mapping of codewords to Bloom filters: the trans-
formation from binarized LGBPHS to Bloom filters obscures
the number of occurrences of each codeword as well as
its original position. The average percentage of re-mapped
codewords (=columns) and according standard deviations for
binarization scheme I is depicted in Fig. 4 (the behaviour
of both binarization schemes is almost identical, as could be
expected from the very similar performance shown in Table I).
As expected (see Sect. III-D), two different trends may be
observed, namely: 𝑖) for a fixed value of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠, the bigger
𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠, the lower the percentage of re-mapped words (i.e.,
less information is lost); and 𝑖𝑖) for a fixed value of 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠,
the bigger 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠, the higher the percentage of re-mapped
words.
For the best performing configuration in terms of EER
(𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 4, 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 10), 57.50% of the codewords are re-
mapped. Therefore, on average ∣b∣ = 10 ⋅ (1− 0.575) = 4.25.
This means that an eventual brute-force attacker would have
to try ∼ 220 different sequences for each of the 𝐾 =
80×(10×6) = 4, 800 sub-blocks (see Fig. 2, 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 10).
It was shown in Sect. III-D that the optimal re-mapping
in terms of security would be 1− ∣b∣/𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 ≃ 1− 3/4 =
25%. In Fig. 4 may be observed that higher values of 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠
and lower values of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 will lead to percentages of re-
mapped words closer to this value. However, it is shown in
Fig. 2 that for higher values of 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 the number of possible
sequences increases. A good balance could be thus 𝑛𝐵𝑖𝑡𝑠 = 4
and 𝑛𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑠 = 20: security is considerably improved at a
small cost in terms of performance (EER rises from 5.50% to
5.75%, see Table I), while template size is also reduced (from
9.38 KB to 4.69 KB, see Eq. 4). In this case, 69.69% of the
words are re-mapped, which leads to ∣b∣ = 20 ⋅ (1− 0.697) =
6.06 on average. As depicted in Fig. 2, an eventual attacker
would thus need to try ∼ 251 different sequences for each of
the 𝐾 = 80×(10×3) = 2, 400 sub-blocks (i.e., ∼ 262 possible
sequences).
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we introduced the generation of irreversible
facial biometric templates based on adaptive Bloom filters. We
proved that the proposed system, which builds upon a repre-
sentative LGBPHS-based facial recognition system, maintains
(or even improves) biometric performance, while securing the
biometric information through irreversibility. Furthermore, the
template size is drastically reduced and the matching process
sped up, so that this scheme can be a good solution for systems
with low computational capabilities such as match-on-card
applications. It is also found that Bloom filter-based trans-
forms, which have previously been applied to iris biometrics
[9], represent a rather generic approach for biometric template
protection which can be successfully used with different traits.
This paper is a very promising study on the feasibility
of applying a Bloom filter-based protection scheme to a face
verification system. Even if the binarization scheme II showed
limited benefits for the configurations considered (EER slightly
lower, similar irreversibility properties), it is expected to be
more generic when applied to other data or configurations. As
part of the future work, we will consider different face-based
verification algorithms. Furthermore, in order to construct a
ISO/IEC IS 24745 [7] compliant template protection system,
we will additionally incorporate application-specific non-linear
transformations of irreversible features to achieve unlinkability.
Finally, since Bloom filters have been successfully applied to
iris templates, and face and iris are commonly regarded as
a user-friendly trait combination, we will investigate the fea-
sibility of constructing a multi-biometric template protection
scheme based on adaptive Bloom filters.
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